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Over the last twenty years, the scholarly field of erroneous convictions
has skyrocketed, with multiple articles and books exploring the failures that
convict the innocent. However, there has been comparatively little attention
to the other side of the coin, failed prosecutions, when the criminal justice
system falls short in convicting the likely perpetrator. In this Article, we take
up an analysis of failed prosecutions, simultaneously seeking to define its
breadth and explain its relation to erroneous convictions. We explore
potential hypotheses for the existence of failed prosecutions and then
compare those theories to a set of failed prosecutions compiled from a
moderately-sized district attorney’s office. With almost no prior research on
failed prosecutions, these empirical data help to put meat on the theoretical
bones of the concept. In the end, we argue that failed prosecutions and
erroneous convictions may be seen as different sides of the same coin of
miscarriages-of-justice. Not only do both reflect significant errors by the
criminal justice system, but the sources of each also appear to be surprisingly
similar.
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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who studies miscarriages of justice is familiar with
Blackstone’s famous principle that it is better that ten guilty people go free
than one innocent person be convicted.1 The mathematical asymmetry of the
Blackstone Ratio reflects the principle that a fair-functioning criminal justice
system should not regularly convict the innocent. But what of the opposite
problem, when the guilty go free? Both represent a miscarriage of justice.2
As Simon points out, “[f]ewer than one-half of felony crimes are ever
reported to the police, and only one of every five reported felonies is cleared
by an arrest.”3 Society has an interest in catching and holding accountable
the guilty. If a guilty defendant escapes conviction because the police or
prosecution have violated his or her constitutional rights, the victim
undoubtedly suffers an injustice in seeing the perpetrator go unpunished.4

1

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (1769).
In two works, Forst discusses wrongful convictions and failed prosecutions, considering
them both to be miscarriages of justice. See Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice
from Victimization to Reintegration, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1209 (2010) [hereinafter Forst,
Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration]; BRIAN FORST,
ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES (2004) [hereinafter FORST, ERRORS OF
JUSTICE].
3
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 4 (2012).
4
Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1069–70 (2015).
2
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Over the last twenty years, the scholarly field of erroneous convictions
has skyrocketed, with multiple articles and books exploring the failures that
convict the innocent.5 But, there has been comparatively little attention to the
other side of the coin, failed prosecutions, when the criminal justice system
falls short in convicting the likely perpetrator. Recently, one of the authors
of this Article argued that “it is now time for empirical scholars also to begin
to study other sources of error and inaccuracy . . . in the criminal justice
system . . . erroneous outcomes, not just erroneous convictions.”6 Some
scholars refer to this as “false acquittals,”7 but that locates the problem
primarily with judges and jurors, who may not appreciate the significance of
the evidence offered and, thus, unwittingly acquit a guilty suspect.8 Others
conflate “false prosecutions” with erroneous convictions, thereby
constructing a larger category of system failure in which the “police, defense,
prosecutors, or court erred to such a degree that [a] conviction could not be
sustained.”9
In this Article, we take up the topic of failed prosecutions,
simultaneously seeking to define its breadth and explain its relation to
erroneous convictions. We explore potential hypotheses for the existence of
failed prosecutions and then compare those theories to a set of failed
prosecutions compiled from a moderately-sized district attorney’s office.
With almost no prior research on failed prosecutions, these empirical data
put meat on the theoretical bones of the concept. In the end, we argue that
5
See, e.g., Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Predicting
Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471 (2014); EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS:
STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD (Allison D. Redlich, James R. Acker, Robert J. Norris &
Catherine L. Bonventre eds., 2014); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Richard A. Leo, Rethinking the Study of
Miscarriages of Justice: Developing a Criminology of Wrongful Conviction, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 201 (2005).
6
Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful Conviction: A Decade Later, 33 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82, 99 (2017).
7
Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319, 1326 (2018);
Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Pattern in Criminal
Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False Acquittals and
Serial Offenders Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2018) [hereinafter Laudan,
Different Strokes for Different Folks]; Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between BlackstoneLike Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 101
(1996); Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1257–60.
8
But see DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED
INNOCENT (2012) (seeking to determine when the acquitted are factually innocent).
9
REBECCA SILBERT, JOHN HOLLWAY & DARYA LARIZADEH, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L.,
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: A COST ANALYSIS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, ERRORS, AND FAILED
PROSECUTIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2015).
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failed prosecutions and erroneous convictions may be seen as different sides
of the same miscarriages-of-justice coin. Not only do both reflect significant
errors by the criminal justice, but the sources of each also appear to be
surprisingly similar.
This Article is divided into five parts. In Part I, we offer a definition of
failed prosecutions and explain how our broader construction compares to
prior research that largely limits its inquiry to the courtroom or jury box. In
Part II, we extrapolate from existing literature on wrongful convictions and
justice-system error to offer a matrix of potential hypotheses for failed
prosecutions. In Part III, we turn to a set of case data on failed prosecutions
initially compiled by a prosecutor’s office. Cleaning, coding, and analyzing
these cases, we are able to focus the set of potential sources for failed
prosecutions. In Part IV, we return to the prior hypotheses to compare these
new data with the proffered theories. Finally, in Part V, we address the
limitations of our research, outline future possible research, and close by
arguing that the sources and nature of erroneous convictions are more similar
to failed prosecutions than currently envisioned.
I. A DEFINITION
In two works, Forst has examined the broad topic of “miscarriages of
justice.”10 As he notes, there are least two ways in which the criminal justice
system “fails” —whether by convicting the innocent or failing to convict the
guilty.11 While this is sometimes understood by the social scientist’s notion
of Type 1 and Type 2 error,12 Forst considers the failure to convict and punish
a culpable criminal for the appropriate offense an “error of impunity.”13 We
use the term “failed prosecution.”
A two-by-two table helps to illustrate this concept. As Diagram 1
indicates, in two of the four boxes the criminal justice system (or at least the
adjudicative phase of the criminal justice process) “works” as intended:
convicting the factually guilty and acquitting or dismissing charges against
the innocent. By contrast, there is a miscarriage of justice when the factually
innocent are convicted or the factually guilty are absolved of responsibility.

10

Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
11
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1209–10.
12
Type 1 error is sometimes known as a false positive, which in this context would be an
erroneous conviction. Type 2 error is a false negative, such as when a guilty suspect escapes
conviction.
13
FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 23.

2022]

THEORIZING FAILED PROSECUTIONS

333

Diagram 1 – Miscarriages of Justice

Factually
Guilty
Factually
Innocent

Defendant
Convicted
System Works –
Plea or verdict
Wrongful
Conviction

Defendant
Goes Free
Failed Prosecution
System Works –
Dismissal or Acquittal

This is a broader definition of failed prosecution than others have
posited. As we explain in the next Part, most prior theorizing, which has
focused on “false acquittals,” locates error in the decisions of judges or jurors
to let the guilty go free.14 Although the source for acquittals could occur
earlier in the criminal justice system—as, for example, from a failure to
maintain chain of custody for a biological sample—the terminology of false
acquittal, by definition, leaves out cases in which prosecutors or courts
dismiss charges against defendants who are likely guilty. Since fewer than
five percent of criminal cases are resolved by trial,15 an exclusive focus on
false acquittals also excludes the great bulk of other cases in which mistakes
of some kind prevent the conviction of the guilty.
We propose extending the lens outwards to problems, errors, or failures
in the criminal justice system that prevent the conviction of suspects who
likely committed a crime. Theoretically, this approach could expand the
pathway to a point before a crime is even reported—such as the attitudes,
beliefs or fears that discourage a victim from calling law enforcement.
Indeed, as Diagram 2 indicates, there are multiple cut-points in the criminal
justice system for the study of “failed” cases.

14

See sources cited supra note 7.
Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone: Trials
Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, 101 JUDICATURE 26, 28
(2017), https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/going-going-but-not-quite-gone-trials-continueto-decline-in-federal-and-state-courts-does-it-matter/ [https://perma.cc/62DQ-59KZ].
15
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Diagram 2 – Various “Cut-points” For Considering Failed
Prosecutions
►Level 1: Problems that discourage a victim from reporting the crime
►Level 2: Errors that cause the police not to stop, investigate or arrest a
guilty suspect
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬
►Level 3: Mistakes that convince a prosecutor not to bring charges for
crimes committed
►Level 4: Errors that lead a prosecutor or judge to dismiss charges against
guilty suspects
►Level 5: Problems that convince a prosecutor to charge for a lesser or
different crime.
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬
►Level 6: Conditions that lead judges or jurors to acquit guilty defendants
At one end, researchers could focus on problems that prevent cases from
reaching the attention of law enforcement or those that dissuade or stop
officers from arresting or citing suspects. On the other end of the spectrum,
scholars of false acquittals already have examined the decisions of judges or
jurors to acquit factually guilty defendants.16 Our focus in this study will be
processes or errors that lie within the knowledge or control of prosecutors,
such as failures in police investigations that convince prosecutors to drop
charges or those that thwart them from obtaining a conviction that matches
the crime committed. It addresses actions by prosecutors themselves that lead
them to file the wrong charges, prepare their case inadequately, or pursue the
wrong trial strategy, among others. And it covers the actions of judges and
juries that thwart prosecutors from obtaining a conviction of a defendant who
likely committed the crime.
We choose this cut-point for two reasons. First, we seek to expand the
scholarly focus of failed prosecutions beyond false acquittals. That research
essentially sees police and prosecutorial action as extant variables, whereas
we already know from erroneous convictions that miscarriages of justice can
often be traced to a police officer or prosecutor whose mistake changed the
outcome of a case.17 Second, previous research has established the vital

16
Terry Connolly, Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous
Acquittals, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 102–03 (1987).
17
Jon Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a
Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 851–52 (2010).
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power of prosecutors in steering the outcome of a case.18 Whether by their
charging decisions or plea offers, prosecutors are often said to be the most
powerful individuals in the criminal justice process.19 Hence, to fully
appreciate their influence and better understand the errors that hamper their
work, we examine cases from the start of arrest or citation.
Central to the study of failed prosecutions is defining what it means for
the “guilty” to go unpunished. It is a central precept of the American justice
system that criminal suspects are only held accountable if their guilt can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Anything less than that standard of
proof and they are presumed innocent by law.21 Thus, any discussion of failed
prosecutions must acknowledge that, at least legally, the suspects in these
cases may well be innocent.
In other publications, scholars have contrasted the concepts of factual
and legal innocence, distinguishing those exonerations in which the
defendant did not commit the crime from those in which the conviction was
overturned because of reasonable doubt or procedural violations.22 Here, we
flip the concepts to suggest that failed prosecutions may involve legal
innocence and factual guilt. Or, put another way, but for some error in the
investigation, prosecution, or consideration of a criminal case, a suspect who
actually committed a crime would have been found guilty of that crime.
This definition, in turn, raises the larger question of whose standard of
guilt to employ. Certainly, two people may look at the same evidence from a
crime and reach different conclusions about a suspect’s guilt. Perhaps a
detective sees a weapon, deduces a motive and opportunity, and concludes
that the person who found the proceeds of the crime is responsible.
Conversely, a different investigator may believe that the evidence is
circumstantial and that someone else committed the crime. Because this is an
exploratory article on an under-researched subject, we employ a modified
reasonable person standard—that of the reasonable prosecutor who is aware
of the case facts—in considering the prospect of factual guilt in these cases.
More specifically, we used the judgment of prosecutors as a starting point in
18

ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3–
18 (2007).
19
See, e.g., DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012) (investigating the role of prosecutors in wrongful
convictions); David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV.
CRIMINOLOGY 451, 453–54 (2018).
20
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
beyond_a_reasonable_doubt [https://perma.cc/P4QH-NABL].
21
See Presumption of Innocence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
presumption_of_innocence [https://perma.cc/4VEA-6VQA].
22
Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 483.
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our empirical assessments of potential failed prosecutions, and then applied
our own independent assessment to remove all cases in which we believed a
reasonable person could not conclude the defendant was guilty. Our goal was
to understand what judgements, processes, or problems prevent an
adjudgment of guilt.
This is not to say that acquitting the factually guilty or dismissing
charges against them is legally wrong under the circumstances. Certainly, if
a patrol officer violates a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights in obtaining
key evidence, the exclusionary rule mandates suppression of the evidence,
and with it, potentially the dismissal of charges as a whole.23 But, just as there
was a miscarriage of justice against the suspect—his or her Fourth
Amendment rights violated, for example—there is, as Forst explains, an error
of impunity when a criminal goes unpunished.24 Our goal is to look beyond
the issue of legal accuracy in the criminal justice system to also examine
factual accuracy: To the extent that our criminal justice fails to punish those
who commit crimes, why is that so, and what, if anything, can be done to
prevent that?
Little of the existing literature addresses failed prosecutions, per se. To
be sure, Forst writes of “miscarriages of justice,” arguing that the failure to
convict criminals is as much a systemic error as are wrongful convictions.25
But, to the extent that prior literature has addressed the sources of such
mistakes, they have largely fallen into three categories. First, scholars have
examined the potential disconnect between juror perception and judicial
judgement, comparing those cases in which jurors acquitted the defendant
when judges would have convicted.26 In essence, these works suggest that
jurors, who are not trained in the intricacies of law and are not veteran
observers of trial advocacy, make mistakes and fail to hold some criminals
responsible that judges, who, in theory, bring a more impartial temperament,
would have convicted.27 In Kalven and Zeisel’s famous study, twenty percent
of queried federal judges would have convicted a defendant that jurors
acquitted.28 Indeed, as other scholars contend, a “closer look at jury decisions

23
See Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
exclusionary_rule [https://perma.cc/RA27-L8LF].
24
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1240–41; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 23–30.
25
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1275; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 22–23.
26
See, e.g., Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 305, 307 (2007).
27
See, e.g., id. But see GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 8 at 79–98.
28
HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966).
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reveals a serious gap between what we expect from juries and what probably
occurs . . . . [W]e as a society should recognize and acknowledge the
abundance of error.”29
“Juror error” is, of course, a loaded term. It presupposes that judges,
scholars, or other observers are capable of correctly deducing a defendant’s
guilt and that jurors improperly depart from this standard. Putting that
question aside for the moment, subsequent studies have sought to explain the
basis for intentional juror error.30 For example, some scholars and
practitioners raise the prospect of jury nullification, a situation in which
jurors rightfully know that the defendant committed the crime but for extralegal reasons choose to acquit.31 Perhaps the most famous description comes
from drug prosecutions in the District of Columbia during the 1980s in which
“lawyers and judges increasingly [came to believe] that some AfricanAmerican jurors vote[d] to acquit black defendants for racial reasons, a
decision sometimes expressed as the juror’s desire not to send yet another
black man to jail.”32
Other scholars suggest that juror error is unintentional, usually the result
of their inability to appreciate the legal concepts raised at trial or their
difficulty understanding the arcane deliberation instructions given to them by
judges.33 As Uviller explains, “In some cases, the judge’s instruction is quite
impossible to apply literally . . . . Thus, jurors regularly vote between firstand second-degree murder, with its awesome consequence, on a charged
distinction that defies rational understanding.” 34 Nor should this be seen as
an isolated problem. For more than forty years,35 sociolegal scholarship has
been replete with results suggesting that judges’ instructions are
“incomprehensible” and full of “legalese”36 that “can inhibit jurors’ ability to

29

Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 625 (2002).
30
See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (1998).
31
Id.
32
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
33
Joseph L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, Diagnostic Test Methodology in the Design
and Analysis of Judge-Jury Agreement Studies, 39 JURIMETRICS 59, 61 (1998); Robert P.
Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1307–08 (1979).
34
H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies on Jury Misgivings and the
Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRIM. L.F. 1, 19–20 (1990).
35
See, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, supra note 33.
36
Id. at 1307.
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comprehend and apply the law.”37 Although raised more typically as a
potential source of wrongful convictions,38 jurors may be just as willing to
settle on a lesser-included offense and absolve a defendant of greater criminal
responsibility because they cannot quite understand the judge’s statement of
the law or her instructions of their duty.39
Still a third branch of the literature investigates failed prosecutions from
an almost economic perspective, seeking to estimate the rates of “false
negatives”40 and predicting how many more criminal defendants would be
convicted if the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of trial were adjusted
to a lesser standard of proof.41 By definition, much of this work is theoretical,
seeking to estimate where the burden of proof should be set to arrive at the
“correct” level of criminal liability.42 Based on hypothetical assumptions,
Laudan, for example, argues that convicting a serial offender should require
a comparatively lower burden of proof because of the heightened risks of
failing to convict an extremely dangerous suspect.43
This research generally starts from the presumption that police and
prosecutorial work is fixed at a given level of effort and quality. So, if the
guilty are not convicted, fault must lie with jurors who ignored or could not
understand the law or the application of legal standards that give too much
benefit of the doubt to the guilty. This hypothesis has been criticized as
empirically inconsistent with how jurors evaluate criminal cases, in which
they may begin with an assumption that the defendant has done something
wrong.44 And there are many more potential explanations at play. Ironically,
several of these can also explain wrongful convictions.
Police may poorly investigate a case and miss key evidence or become
so devoted to one theory of a case that they fail to fully investigate others.
37
Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153, 153 (1982).
38
See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance, Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Toward Criminal
Jury Instructions that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 201
(1984).
39
See Uviller, supra note 34, at 19. But see GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 8, at 61–63,
137–40.
40
Larry Laudan, When the “Not-Guilty” Falsely Pass for Innocent, ERROR STATS. PHIL.
(July 3, 2015), https://errorstatistics.com/2015/07/03/larry-laudan-when-the-not-guiltyfalsely-pass-for-innocent-the-frequency-of-false-acquittals-guest-post/ [https://perma.cc/82
NP-YUAV]; Larry Laudan, Eyewitness Identifications: One More Lesson on the Costs of
Excluding Relevant Evidence, 7 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 272 (2012) (comparing false
negatives, failed prosecutions, with false positives, wrongful convictions).
41
See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 16, at 10116; Epps, supra note 4, at 1073.
42
Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks, supra note 7, at 1253.
43
Id. at 1244–45.
44
See GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 8, at 53–55, 137–40.
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Forensic technicians may err in collecting physical evidence, making it
unusable. Prosecutors, too, may rely on untested witnesses whose stories are
unsubstantiated. And, of course, judges or jurors may improperly weigh
evidence, credit witnesses they should not, and in turn contribute to the
miscarriage of justice. These potential factors go beyond the triers of fact or
the legal standards employed to consider guilt. In turn, we think it time to
broaden the conceptualization and study of failed prosecutions and the extent
to which sources beyond the courtroom lead to the dismissal or acquittal of
suspects who likely committed a crime.
II. THEORIES FOR FAILED PROSECUTIONS
There have been few publications that have attempted to catalog the
established reasons or theorized sources for failed prosecutions.45 We begin,
then, with a deep dive through the literature of justice-system error to try to
piece together potential factors. From this work, we have identified multiple
sources that may explain why criminals go unprosecuted or convicted. To be
sure, some factors occur before police even enter the equation, such as an
offender’s skill in evading detection46 or the reticence of some victims to
report an offense.47 From Diagram 2, these would be Level 1 problems,
which is not a focus of this paper. We are interested in those factors within
the control of prosecutors and other professionals in the criminal justice
system—those sources that derail cases against criminals once the facts are
known to justice officials.
Using this delimitation, we have identified eight broad categories within
the literature that conceive the sources of failed prosecutions. Moving from
the investigative to trial stages of a case, these include:

45

See Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
46
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1219.
47
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 643
(1980).
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Flawed Police Investigations
Forensic Error
Official Misconduct
Errors in Charging
Prosecutor Biases
Competence of Prosecutors
Victim/Witness Cooperation
Victim/Witness Credibility

To scholars of wrongful convictions, many of these categories should
seem familiar. Prior research has linked erroneous convictions to: errors in
forensic testing or testimony; police or prosecutor misconduct; and victim or
witness credibility, among others.48 But, this should not come as a surprise,
since, as Forst explains, erroneous convictions and failed prosecutions are
both miscarriages of justice.49 One is a false positive (wrongful conviction),
and the other is a false negative (failed prosecutions). They are, therefore,
different sides of the same coin. And, as we argue and as others have
claimed,50 they may even have similar consequences. Some of the mistakes
that convict the innocent might also lead people astray in absolving the guilty.
In presenting these hypotheses, we do not claim that they are definitive
sources of failed prosecutions, nor can we rank them by likely causal
influence. In this Part only, we offer our distillation of the literature that
theorizes the causes of failed prosecutions.
A. FLAWED POLICE INVESTIGATION

Research on wrongful convictions has already identified flawed or
inadequate police investigation as a source of error.51 Police officers
sometimes fail to appreciate the significance of evidence they are presented,
they fail to consider all potential suspects, and they may suffer from tunnel
vision that prevents them from imagining alternative explanations for the
crime.52 The same may be true for failed prosecutions. According to Forst,

48

Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 478–82.
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
50
Frank R. Baumgartner, Amanda Grigg, Rachelle Ramírez & J. Sawyer Lucy, The
Mayhem of Wrongful Liberty: Documenting the Crimes of True Perpetrators in Cases of
Wrongful Incarceration, 81 ALB. L. REV. 1263, 1274–78 (2017).
51
Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 479.
52
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006) (providing a general background on “tunnel
vision” theory); Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 501.
49
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the guilty go free when police do not properly pursue leads or are untrained
in proper interrogation techniques of witnesses and suspects.53 In turn, they
latch onto the wrong suspect or inaccurately conclude that the suspect is not
at hand, thereby allowing the guilty to go free.54 They may also obtain some
evidence against the defendant but not enough to convict him because of the
offender’s evasiveness.55 Perpetrators may leave little evidence, clean it up,
or otherwise obstruct the efforts of law enforcement to fully investigate the
crime.56
B. FORENSIC ERROR

Forst also mentions that police may not be trained properly to collect
evidence,57 which may lead to the spoilage or even loss of key specimens.
Wrongful conviction cases are rife with examples of poor forensic science,
from employing outdated or discredited techniques to relying on evidence
contaminated with the biological material of others beside the suspect or
victim.58 Theoretically, these same sources may be present in failed
prosecutions. Investigators may fail to secure the chain of custody of
evidence. This failure may expose them to charges of tampering, and it could
also cause samples of evidence to become too degraded to be tested.59
Forensic scientists also may fail in the methods they use or the
interpretations they reach. In some wrongful convictions, experts have relied

53

Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1217; FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 24–25. See also RICHARD A. LEO,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) (detailing the ways that police
behavior, especially custodial interrogations, can lead to miscarriages of justice).
54
Richard A. Leo & Steven A. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to False Confession
and Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 13–17 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian
A. Meissner eds., 2010).
55
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1219.
56
FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 23–24.
57
Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, supra
note 2, at 1245.
58
GARRETT, supra note 5 (detailing the sources of wrongful convictions); NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009) (addressing frailties in forensic science).
59
Paul C. Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 527, 537 (1982); John Comley, New Approaches to Sample Identification Tracking
and Technologies for Maintaining the Quality of Stored Samples, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY
WORLD 30, 31 (2017).
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on techniques that have not been sufficiently validated.60 Perhaps the most
known errors involve hair comparison analysis, in which hair left at a crime
scene is compared to that of a possible suspect.61 For years, forensic experts
would testify in court about the similarity of the two samples, sometimes
going beyond the limits of science to suggest that the suspect’s hair and that
of the perpetrator were a match, when the most that could be said was that
they were similar.62
This familiar story, which was true of other pattern evidence,63 such as
tire prints, was more likely to be found among erroneous conviction than
failed prosecution cases. However, as defense teams have become more
adept at scientific evidence and their cross-examinations more formidable,
prosecutors are coming to appreciate that cases can be lost if they fail to
employ the most modern forensic techniques or if their experts are not trained
and prepared to stick to the limits of the science involved.64 This is especially
true as the scientific community is increasingly skeptical of pattern evidence,
including hair comparison, bite and tire marks, bullet casings, and even
fingerprints.65
C. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT

Police or prosecutor error may also tar cases. Some of this error may be
inadvertent or negligent, such as when police stop or search suspects on a
hunch but without sufficient reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
60

Sabra Thomas, Comment, Addressing Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of
Texas’s New Junk Science Writ and Other Measures for Protecting the Innocent, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 1037, 1046 (2015).
61
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 47–62 (2009).
62
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 118–21 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5
CW-559K].
63
Gerald Laporte, Wrongful Convictions and DNA Exonerations: Understanding the Role
of Forensic Science, 279 NIJ JOURNAL 1, 1, 8 (2018), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
250705.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P4P-ZCDL].
64
Conversation with Kristine Hamann, Executive Director, Prosecutors’ Ctr. for
Innovation (Nov. 2019). Ms. Hamann is the former first assistant district attorney in the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office.
65
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 62, at 25. This point was brought home to one of us recently when called for jury
duty. The case involved simple marijuana possession, and the potential jurors during voir dire
peppered the assistant district attorney with many sophisticated questions about the quality of
the field testing done on the sample while questioning whether the police had also sent the
sample to the state crime lab.
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withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.66 But officials may also intentionally
misbehave. Detectives may browbeat suspects into confessing,67 prosecutors
may make inflammatory and misleading remarks in court,68 police or
prosecutors may refuse to disclose material, exculpatory evidence,69 and
officers may even plant evidence at a crime scene.70
Each of these errors has been seen in a case of erroneous conviction,
whereby innocent suspects are essentially steamrolled to a conviction.71
However, it is conceivable that misconduct spoils good cases. An overly
zealous prosecutor who implies that the defendant knew more than he did
might induce judicial intervention and then dismissal when the case was
going just fine without the attorney’s overreach.72 Furthermore, since an
erroneous conviction leaves the true perpetrator unpunished, the mistakes
that convict the innocent also divert official attention from the crimes that
could be solved and effectively prosecuted.73
D. CHARGING

One of the most central decisions to a criminal case is a prosecutor’s
choice of the charge:74 charge too lightly and a criminal may evade
appropriate punishment; charge too severely and the defendant may escape
any punishment at all as judges or juries are unwilling to convict on facts that
66

Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 335 (2004).
67
LEO, supra note 53, at 42.
68
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 279–80 (2004).
69
Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2007).
70
Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L
REV. 1133, 1137–38, 1155–56 (2013).
71
Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 478–82.
72
See, e.g., United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir. 1984).
73
Indeed, these cases are the very example of the overlap between erroneous convictions
and failed prosecutions. On one hand, the defendant should never have been convicted of a
crime when based on illegally obtained evidence; on the other hand, if the defendant were the
likely culprit, his conviction might have been secured had police properly obtained a search
warrant or identified appropriate grounds to stop and question him. James R. Acker, The
Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty Go Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629,
1631 (2012); Baumgartner, Grigg, Ramírez & Lucy, supra note 50, at 1286; James R.
Acker, Reliable Justice: Advancing the Twofold Aim of Establishing Guilt and Protecting the
Innocent, 82 ALB. L. REV. 719, 721–22 (2018); Robert J. Norris, Jennifer N. Weintraub, James
R. Acker, Allison D. Redlich & Catherine L. Bonventre, The Criminal Costs of Wrongful
Convictions: Can We Reduce Crime by Protecting the Innocent?, 19 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 367, 368 (2020).
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DAVIS, supra note 18, at 3–18.
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do not fit an overstated charge. The academic literature is replete with
concerns of overcharging as the basis for a failed prosecution. One of the first
mentions was Albert Alschuler’s 1968 article on prosecutors and plea
bargaining in which he distinguished between horizontal and vertical
overcharging.75 In the former, a prosecutor charges a suspect with more
crimes than warranted, whereas in the latter the offense level of the charge is
too high.76 More recently, Richard Delgado has criticized the prosecution for
overcharging George Zimmerman in the death of Trayvon Martin, saying
that the jury might have convicted Zimmerman had the charge been reduced
to a less serious one like felony stalking coupled with a felony murder
charge.77 Scholars and defense advocates have raised similar criticisms in
other noteworthy acquittals,78 including Cliven and Ammon Bundy79 and
John Wiley Price.80
Police and prosecutors may also undercharge a case—seeking
conviction on a lesser included offense rather than the one that best fits the
facts.81 Of course, this is similar to the practice of plea bargaining, in which
prosecutors accept a guilty plea to a crime less severe than the one charged,
but plea bargaining is a mode for disposing cases.82 When officials
undercharge a case—whether because “the detective is so corrupt that he is
willing to undercharge the crime in order to close the file”83 or because
domestic violence cases have been historically and “notoriously
underplayed”84—they ensure from the very beginning that the defendant will
not be held fully accountable for his misbehavior.
75

Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
85–86 (1968).
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Id.
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Richard Delgado, The Trayvon Martin Trial—Two Comments and an Observation,
47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2014).
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Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 709–12 (2014).
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Matt Pearce, How the Government Lost Its Case Against the Oregon Occupiers, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-oregon-malheurlegal-defense-20161028-story.html [https://perma.cc/D49T-JE4D].
80
Mark Curriden, White-Collar Bar Blasts Federal Prosecutors, FBI in John Wiley Price
Acquittal, DALL. BUS. J.: TEX. LAWBOOK (May 1, 2017, 8:25 AM), https://
www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2017/05/01/white-collar-bar-blasts-federal-prosecutorsfbi.html [https://perma.cc/Y22W-FXDJ].
81
Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 775–76 (2016).
82
See generally STEVEN P. GROSSMAN, PLEA BARGAINING MADE REAL (2021) (explaining
how plea bargaining disposes of most criminal convictions).
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Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1089 (1997).
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Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 317
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Implicit in the decision to charge is the standard of proof the prosecutor
requires to move a case forward. Some offices are content to indict and
litigate a case on the bare minimum standard of probable cause,85 whereas
others choose to bring charges only when prosecutors believe they can prove
the case to a judge or jury.86 Both are legally acceptable approaches, although
as Forst explains, they come with opposing risks.87 Should a prosecutor bring
a case in which there is a basis but not near certainty of the defendant’s guilt,
she takes the risk that a judge or jury may erroneously convict the suspect for
a crime he did not commit. However, if she acts cautiously and requires
certitude before litigating, she will dismiss some cases in which the defendant
is factually guilty.
Not all prosecutors engage in a careful balancing of the available
evidence against the appropriate charge. Some writers accuse prosecutors of
vindictiveness and bias in charging that cause them to ignore or lose potential
convictions. William Conour claims that spiteful prosecutors “upcharge”
defendants who exercise their statutory or procedural rights.88 For example,
if a defendant were to challenge the seizure of drugs with a motion to exclude,
a prosecutor who otherwise would have considered a charge of possession
might respond angrily with a heightened charge of possession with the intent
to distribute. Were that charge to be dismissed, or should a judge or jury
refuse to convict for lack of evidence, the prosecutor’s bitterness would have
thwarted a just outcome.89
In a similar vein, other writers point to prosecutors’ biases as a basis for
failed prosecutions.90 Specifically, they criticize some prosecutors for overly
crediting the explanation of police in cases of excessive force or officerinvolved shootings so that charges are never brought.91 Devon Carbado, for
example, argues that police officers’ use of excessive force is “translated” by
85

Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983), this standard requires a
“substantial chance” of criminal activity.
86
See Belén Lowrey-Kinberg, Jon Gould & Rachel Bowman, “Heart and Soul of a
Prosecutor”: The Impact of Prosecutor Role Orientation on Charging Decisions, 49 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 239, 245–46 (2021).
87
FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115–16.
88
William F. Conour, Criminal Justice Notes, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 25 RES
GESTAE 140, 140–41 (1981).
89
By contrast, were a judge or jury to convict on the unreasonably heightened charge, the
defendant might also face the injustice of disproportionate punishment.
90
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1518 (2016); Isaac G. Lara, Shielded from Justice: How State
Attorneys General Can Provide Structural Remedies to the Criminal Prosecutions of Police
Officers, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551, 551 (2017).
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See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 90, at 1518; Lara, supra note 90, at 551.
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prosecutors as “justifiable force,” in turn allowing guilty police officers to
escape legal responsibility.92 More generally, Lara claims that the “reciprocal
relationship” between police and prosecutors creates a “a real or perceived
conflict-of-interest” that, again, biases prosecutors against the possibility that
police officers have broken the law and warrant punishment.93 To the extent
that prosecutors dismiss or refuse to prosecute criminal acts by law
enforcement officers, these institutional blinders may be at play.
E. PROSECUTOR COMPETENCE

Successful prosecutions presume the competence of the prosecutor, who
is able to convince factfinders of the defendant’s guilt or effectively negotiate
with the defense to achieve a guilty plea. Nonetheless, lawyers vary in their
talents.94 Prior caselaw has examined ineffective defense lawyering,95 a
deficiency that itself may justify overturning a defendant’s conviction.96
Research also has established that the “the prosecution’s skill level is crucial”
to the outcome in serious cases.97 Experienced prosecutors prepare cases
better than their colleagues, make smarter strategic decisions in court, and
have better rapport with judges and jurors.98 As a result, they win more often
at trial. They also are more familiar with defense tactics and can strike an
advantageous bargain in plea bargaining.99
It is important, of course, not to conflate a prosecutor’s loss with an
injustice. Sometimes, an indictment or charge is wrong, and the state should
lose. But, when a guilty defendant goes free because an inexperienced or
unskilled prosecutor makes an avoidable mistake, the failure becomes a
miscarriage of justice. Such may have been the situation in the Trayvon
Martin case, where the prosecution failed to prepare its witness, Rachel
92
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Jeantel, sufficiently for court so that she became confused in her testimony
and was tripped up in cross-examination.100 Even if she otherwise might have
been a credible witness, confusion in a witness’ testimony likely dilutes their
persuasive power with the triers of fact.
F. VICTIM AND WITNESS COOPERATION

Ms. Jeantel’s experience highlights the importance of credible and wellprepared witnesses for the prosecution’s case, but in many cases “alleged
victims and key witnesses fail to show for trials.”101 In one county, for
example, up to forty murder cases in a given year were dismissed or had
charges reduced in large part because key witnesses would not cooperate.102
The problem is especially acute in cases of domestic violence when victims
either still love their perpetrators or fear they will be unable to escape them
and, thus, refuse to testify against those who battered them.103 This
experience is widespread—from jurisdictions like Toledo, Ohio, where the
majority of domestic violence cases have been dismissed because victims
failed to appear,104 to foreign countries such as the United Kingdom, where
one-third of failed prosecutions in domestic violence cases owed to the
victim’s retracting evidence or failure to attend court.105 It has gotten to the
point that “victims’ refusal to cooperate is ‘the prime reason prosecutors drop

100
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101
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or dismiss domestic violence cases,’” even when police or prosecutors are
convinced a crime has occurred.106
Sometimes that reluctance owes to intimidation, such as in drug cases
where a higher-up threatens a street dealer or courier from testifying.107 Gang
cases are notorious for witnesses gone mute.108 In New Jersey, for example,
“slam-dunk [murder] cases” can devolve quickly into failed prosecutions
when fellow or even rival gang members “announce [they will not] testify
for fear [that they will] be ostracized for helping the police—or wind up
murdered.”109 Horrifically, even the grandmother of a seven-year-old girl
who was shot and killed by a stray bullet in gang crossfire would not talk to
police or finger a suspect for fear she would “have to move out of the
country” if she did.110
In other cases, a witness’ reluctance can be procured. Perhaps the most
famous examples are sexual assault or domestic violence cases, in which the
initial accuser declines to go forward on the criminal charge and then settles
a civil claim against the alleged perpetrator.111 In many of the well-known
cases, the suspect is a celebrity.112 In 2015, for example, former NFL player
Greg Hardy escaped domestic violence charges when his ex-girlfriend
refused to come to court and testify in the retrial of his earlier conviction.113
Investigating the matter further, prosecutors reported “reliable information
that Holder [had] reached a settlement before the trial” with the victim in
which she would not testify.114
106
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GHT7-PDSD].
111
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12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3885056 [https://perma
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G. VICTIM AND WITNESS CREDIBILITY

Even when victims or witnesses are willing to participate in a
prosecution and testify against the defendant, they may not be seen as
credible by judges or jurors.115 Indeed, as a program in judicial education
explains, “If witnesses are deemed not credible in their testimony, that could
derail prosecution efforts to secure a guilty verdict or allow the defense to
raise the reasonable doubt necessary to prevent a conviction.”116 To be sure,
scholars of erroneous convictions have long warned about the veracity of
informants or “snitches,” who police or prosecutors cultivate and/or whose
testimony is rewarded by some form of compensation or reduced charges
against themselves or their family members.117 However, police informants
may be accurate in some cases and yet are discounted by jurors who perceive
them as having sold out or snitched.118
More concerning are those cases in which the biases of judges and jurors
color their accurate assessment of victims and witnesses. Research suggests
that triers of fact may discredit the reports of non-white accusers or attribute
blame to a female victim when they would not to a man.119 For example,
scholars found that mock jurors are more likely to hold non-white victims at
least partially responsible for their mistreatment in child sexual abuse cases
as compared to when the victim is white.120 Even a meta-analysis from as
recently as 2015 found that jurors sometimes subscribe to “rape myths” when
judging victims for their drinking and sexual habits rather than focusing on
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Credibility Scale: An Outcome Measure for Expert Witness Research, 28 BEHAV. SCI & L.
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116
Credibility and the “Reasonable Person”, UNIV. OF N.M. JUD. EDUC. CTR.,
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the perpetrator’s conduct in the assault.121 Indeed, some claim that the singer
R. Kelly escaped punishment for years because his accusers were “black girls
and women who are young or underage . . . poor or working . . . who are not
famous.”122 As such, they faced a “higher” burden “to get people to care”
about their plight and claims.123
To be sure, credibility assessments of witnesses plague both sides of a
criminal case, with jurors sometimes over-crediting the testimony of state
witnesses.124 Here, though, the concern is that judges, jurors, or even police
or prosecutors may discount the word of a victim or witness if she is nonwhite and/or female or if her behavior does not fit a presumed model of
“acceptable” victimhood.125 That the perpetrators of crimes against such
victims may go unpunished may accentuate the disparities of race, gender,
and wealth that already afflict the criminal justice system.126
III. CASE DATA
A. METHODOLOGY

Each of the theories presented in Part II is just that—a hypothesis for
why prosecutors may lose cases in which the defendant is factually
responsible and a supposition that the sources between erroneous convictions
and failed prosecutions may be more closely aligned than otherwise thought.
To our knowledge, no one has sought to catalog or quantify the multiple
potential sources for failed prosecutions. As a next step in unpacking the
nature of failed prosecutions, we are able to tie the synthesis of the literature
view to an accounting of failed prosecutions in a state prosecutor’s office.

121

Sokratis Dinos, Nina Burrowes, Karen Hammond & Christina Cunliffe, A Systematic
Review of Juries’ Assessment of Rape Victims: Do Rape Myths Impact on Juror DecisionMaking?, 43 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 36, 37 (2015).
122
Michael Arceneaux, Why R. Kelly May Never Meet the Fate of Harvey Weinstein,
SPLINTER NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://splinternews.com/why-r-kelly-may-nevermeet-the-fate-of-harvey-weinstei-1819873053 [https://perma.cc/8Q46-6E97].
123
Id.
124
Debra Cassens Weiss, Why Do Juries Acquit Police Officers of Brutality? Experts
Offer Differing Explanations, ABA J. (Mar. 15, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/why-juries-acquit-police-officers-experts-offer-differing-explanations
[https://perma.cc/CE8S-Q9YU].
125
Dinos, Burrowes, Hammond & Cunliffe, supra note 121, at 37–40.
126
Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities
in the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 286–89 (2010); JILL LEOVY,
GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015) (presenting a popular account of
a “ghettoside” murder).

2022]

THEORIZING FAILED PROSECUTIONS

351

We were fortunate to locate this office by way of introduction from a
professional organization. In an effort to anonymize the jurisdiction, we call
it Sharpesbury, a county adjoining a major city. In terms of size and crime
rate, Sharpesbury would be comparable to a jurisdiction like San Jose,
California.
In Sharpesbury, the deputy district attorney oversees all cases that pass
through the office and seeks to follow and identify any problematic trends in
the office’s handling of cases. Over the course of a year, he kept a handwritten log of every case that he and his colleagues felt had, in his words,
“gone wrong.” By that, he meant arrests and indictments of suspects who
were likely innocent and cases in which the office had failed to convict a
defendant of any count in a crime127 that prosecutors believe he likely
committed. In previous work, we have called the former class of cases a “near
miss.”128 These are cases in which defendants are “released before trial
or . . . acquitted based on their factual innocence.”129 The latter category
reflects failed prosecutions—the subject of this Article. As a reminder, this
term includes not just acquittals at trial but also the district attorney opting
not to pursue a case, dropping charges, and the like because of errors in
investigation or prosecution.
In our experience, the deputy district attorney’s recordkeeping is rare.
He kept the list of near misses and failed prosecutions for 2017, when the
office processed more than 8,000 cases. Under the condition of anonymity,
he shared his log with us.
Examining the cases, we first separated the near misses and failed
prosecutions, focusing on the 102 cases in which the office did not secure a
conviction. Most of the information was recorded in narrative form, so we
created a method (described below) to code the cases. Our top priority was
to assess whether, in our independent judgment, the cases truly should be
considered failed prosecutions, excluding those that were not. We were
careful throughout this project not to substitute our judgement for that of the
deputy district attorney; his office handled the cases, and as the supervisor
for the attorneys involved, he and his colleagues would be more familiar with
the intricacies of the investigations than us. At the same time, we sought to
remove any cases from the analysis in which we did not believe there was
enough information on which to reasonably base a judgement about the
defendant’s guilt. For purposes of this exploratory Article, we adopted a
127
This term necessarily excludes “under-convictions,” in which the prosecution secured
a conviction for a lesser-included offense but not the one they considered most appropriate for
the crime charged. It is a limitation of the available data.
128
Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 483.
129
Id. at 475.
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standard of reasonable plausibility, eliminating only those cases in which we
believed no reasonable person would believe that the defendant was factually
responsible for the crime.
From there, we turned to the case data (including case descriptions and
explanations) initially provided by the senior prosecutor and assigned two
researchers to code those cases across multiple factors, including the reason
for the failed prosecution, the party most likely responsible for the failure,
and the procedural point at which the prosecution failed (e.g., prior to
charging, on motion to dismiss, at trial, etc.). Coding was initiated by a
trained graduate student, with difficult questions brought to the principal
investigator for discussion and resolution. Spot checks also were performed
to test for consistency. After pilot testing the coding rules, updates were made
and all of the cases coded. Intercoder reliability therein exceeded ninety
percent. Together, this project estimates the sources of failed prosecutions,
the responsible parties, and the disposition that resulted. We did not attempt
to estimate the rate of failed prosecutions, because the deputy district attorney
could not confirm that he was aware of all possible failed prosecutions that
passed through the office. Nonetheless, for an office that processed 8,000
criminal cases in 2017, a set of only 102 failed prosecutions suggests a rate
of just over 1%.
We readily acknowledge multiple imperfections in this approach. A
prosecutor’s judgement that a suspect is guilty does not necessarily mimic
the judgement of a trier of fact, who does not have a vested interest in the
call. Nor was our determination necessarily better when weeding out obvious
cases of innocence. The available records and explanatory narratives were
often modest, and we are unable to say how representative the work of this
jurisdiction is to justice agencies elsewhere in the nation. Indeed, the data we
reviewed are, of course, convenience samples. However, just as the study of
wrongful convictions was advanced by the discovery of untested biological
evidence in the notebooks of a single laboratory technician,130 we believe the
field’s understanding of failed prosecutions can be enhanced by the records
of a medium-sized district attorney’s office that is willing to share the history
of these errors. When there are few examples of a phenomenon, even a single
detailed accounting is illuminating.
Moreover, these data are based on the initial judgements by an
experienced prosecutor’s office tempered by our subsequent check and
analysis of the records. Any time the research team was unclear or doubtful

130

Potential Wrongful Convictions Revealed in Virginia Study, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan.
10, 2012), https://innocenceproject.org/potential-wrongful-convictions-revealed-in-virginiastudy/ [https://perma.cc/W29E-P6VK].
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about the records, we spoke with senior leaders in the office to confirm,
question, or recode their data. As an exploratory study, we believe that the
additional data help us shed light on and begin to think systematically about
an important subject that heretofore has received scant attention.
B. ANALYZING THE CASE DATA

Turning to the cases, the plurality of failed prosecutions in Sharpesbury
were lost because police were unable to collect sufficient evidence to secure
a conviction. In fact, as Table 1 indicates, one-quarter of failed prosecutions
fell into this category. On one level, these cases might not even qualify as
failed prosecutions; after all, if the police and prosecution lack sufficient
evidence to convict a suspect, the defendant is necessarily presumed
innocent.131 However, at the same time, prosecutors believed that they had
enough evidence to cross the “probable cause” line for indictment yet lacked
either enough evidence or a key piece of evidence—a corroborating fact, an
additional eyewitness—that would secure conviction against even the
toughest cross-examination.
In another third of cases, lawyers watched prosecutions evaporate when
victims or witnesses disappeared, refused to cooperate, or had their
credibility questioned. In many of these cases, both the victim and suspect
knew one another, leading prosecutors to wonder whether victims were
seeking to protect friends or family members or if they had been intimidated
into silence.
Legal and constitutional violations accounted for almost twenty percent
of failed prosecutions, as police officers conducted improper stops or
searches and prosecutors failed to bring cases within the required time period,
in turn, violating speedy trial statutes. From there, none of the remaining
sources exceeded five percent of cases, from problems with chain of custody
to the filing of the wrong charge, the incident not constituting a crime, or
otherwise uncategorized errors by police or prosecutors.

131

See Presumption of Innocence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
presumption_of_innocence [perma.cc/4VEA-6VQA].
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Table 1 – Sources of Failed Prosecutions
Reason
Insufficient Evidence
Witness/Victim Credibility
Witness/Victim Unavailable
Improper Stop or Search
Speedy Trial Violation
Witness/Victim Uncooperative
Other Prosecutor Error
Wrong Charge
Chain of Custody
Victim Requests
Judge Discretion
Other Police Error
Wrong Jurisdiction
Defendant Unavailable
Other
N

Frequency
24.5%
12.7%
11.8%
9.8%
8.8%
8.8%
4.9%
4.0%
2.9%
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
3.9%
102

Among all cases of failed prosecution, police were the primary
contributors to the failure nearly forty percent of the time. This estimate,
found in Table 2, may not be surprising given that a prosecutor’s office was
collecting the information and recording notes, and the chief deputy might
have been reluctant to assign fault to his colleagues. However, given that the
primary source in Table 1 was insufficient evidence, and given that police
are generally responsible for the underlying investigation, it is
understandable that police officers would be predominantly responsible.
Victims and witnesses were responsible for another third of failed
prosecutions because of either unwillingness to cooperate, failure to appear,
or lack of credibility. Prosecutors were viewed as responsible in fewer than
twelve percent of cases, which, again, may be explained by lack of
impartiality by the entity collecting data. However, it may also demonstrate
that problems are most likely to appear in the investigative stage of the
criminal justice process. Of note, most of the cases had a singular responsible
party, the analysis indicating multiple parties in just seven percent of cases.
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Table 2 – Responsible Party
Party
Prosecutor
Police
Judge
Defendant
Victim
Witness
Multiple
Other
N

Frequency
11.8%
39.2%
3.9%
2.0%
25.5%
9.8%
6.9%
1.0%
102

Tracing failures in prosecution to a responsible party helps to answer
some of the questions raised in Tables 1 and 2. Specifically, most prosecutor
mistakes involved speedy trial violations, an error within their control.
Although one-quarter of their failures were otherwise unspecified, what
remained were primarily charging decisions or decisions to proceed with
insufficient evidence. By contrast, one half of police mistakes involved
insufficient evidence, with another twenty-two percent of errors turning on
search and seizure violations. Not surprisingly, almost eighty-five percent of
the prosecution failures traceable to victims were because of the victim’s
credibility, unavailability, or uncooperativeness. Similarly, seventy percent
of witness failures turned on their credibility or unavailability. All of these
data are found in Table 3.
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Table 3 – Sources of Failed Prosecution by Responsible Party
Reason

Multiple

Other

10%

28.6%

100%

30.8%

20%

28.6%

Witness/Victim
Unavailable

26.9%

50%

Witness/Victim
Uncooperative

26.9%

Insufficient

Prosecutor

Police

8.3%

50%

Judge

Defendant

Victim

Witness

Evidence
Witness/Victim
Not Credible

2.5%

Stop or Search

22.5%

14.3%

Defendant
Unavailable

50%

Victim Requests
Speedy Trial

14.3%

7.7%
41.7%

Chain of Custody

10%
7.5%

Other Prosecutor
Error

25%

Wrong Charge

8.3%

25%

Judge Discretion

3.8%

14.3%

50%

Other Police

5%

Error
Wrong
Jurisdiction
Other
N

25%
16.7%

2.5%

12

40

4

50%

3.8%

10%

2

26

10

Finally, we examined how failed prosecutions were disposed—that is,
at what point in the investigation and prosecution and through what methods
cases were acknowledged as failed. As Table 4 indicates, the great plurality
(forty percent) ended through voluntary dismissal.
Only five percent of cases concluded at the investigative stage, whereby
police and prosecutors concluded that a prosecution could not be sustained.
An additional fourteen percent of cases also ended early in the process, as
prosecutors refused charges recommended by law enforcement. At the other
end of the justice process, almost one-fifth of cases were lost at trial, with
nearly ten percent of defendants acquitted, respectively, in bench and jury
trials.

7

1
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This leaves another fifth of failed prosecutions that ended in an
“agreement with conditions.” In these cases, prosecutors dismissed charges
in exchange for the defendant’s promise to do something, such as offering
payment to the alleged victim, volunteering for an organization, or keeping
away from a person or location. In several respects, such agreements have all
the markings of a plea bargain, with the defendant informally “sentenced” to
a task and the prosecutor’s office “reducing” charges to none. As such, it is
questionable whether these cases truly count as failed prosecutions. We
include them for two reasons. First, each case was officially dropped,
meaning that neither prosecutors nor justice officials had any further leverage
or control over the defendant. Second, by even collecting data on these cases,
prosecutors in Sharpesbury necessarily considered them to be “failures.” The
office believed these defendants to be responsible for the crimes charged and
sought fines or sentences as criminal punishments. That defendants accepted
the terms of dismissal, then, is more a reflection of the office’s ability to
“make something out of a flawed case” than arriving at the desired resolution
based on what prosecutors believed to have occurred in the investigation or
preparation of the matter.
Table 4 – Modes of Disposal for Failed Prosecutions
Mode of Disposal
Investigation Ends
Charges Rejected
Agreement with Conditions
Voluntary Dismissal
Jury Not Guilty
Bench Not Guilty
N

Proportion of Failed Prosecutions
4.9%
13.7%
21.6%
40.2%
8.8%
10.8%
102

IV. DISCUSSION
The findings from Sharpesbury’s case data support many of the
proffered hypotheses for failed prosecutions. Predominantly, failed
prosecutions in Sharpesbury turned on insufficient evidence, as prosecutors
were left without adequate admissible material to convict a suspect they
otherwise considered guilty. To be sure, this is how the criminal justice
system is intended to operate: suspects are not to be convicted on a
prosecutor’s belief but upon the presentation of credible evidence that proves
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But, when prosecutors believe the suspect
is guilty but are prevented from moving forward because they feel that
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important evidence is missing, the situation warrants better understanding of
what has gone wrong.
Although the Sharpesbury data do not fully explain why evidence was
insufficient in individual cases, the hypotheses discussed earlier offer
potential clues, as do some of the other sources in the dataset. Certainly, a
flawed investigation might leave out key evidence, such as when patrol
officers or detectives are so captured by tunnel vision that they devote
attention to one theory of a case without fully investigating another.
Inexperienced or untrained investigators may fail to appreciate key evidence
in their midst or make mistakes when collecting it. For example, the
Sharpesbury cases identified failures in chain of custody, which often happen
when forensic procedures are not followed. Flawed forensic methods also
may leave prosecutors without sufficient evidence to move forward, such as
when technicians rely on methods with high error rates or exhaust limited
biological evidence so that it cannot be tested in multiple ways.
Cases also can be lost to professional misconduct. The most likely
transgressions are search and seizure violations, as noted in the Sharpesbury
data. It is axiomatic that prosecutors are barred from employing evidence
when acquired in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments; even if the
evidence is the key to conviction, the case should be dismissed and the
prosecution declared a failure if justice officials fail to respect the suspect’s
constitutional rights. Other misconduct can serve as grounds for overturning
a conviction, such as when officers have planted evidence, beaten suspects,
or otherwise engaged in conduct that would be subject to civil remedies, too.
Although we typically think of these cases as wrongful convictions—after
all, the misconduct itself is unconstitutional—it is conceivable that some
number of them might also be failed prosecutions. Where officers are
especially overzealous, illegally securing “evidence” when there are actually
good grounds to suspect the defendant’s guilt, the case becomes a double
miscarriage of justice. Not only would officers violate the suspect’s
constitutional rights under such circumstances, but they also would prevent
a criminal conviction. Admittedly, the Sharpesbury data do not present a
category of official misconduct, but they do categorize upwards of seven
percent of cases as involving “other police or prosecutor error.” We should
hold open the possibility that some number of these cases might involve
intentional misconduct.
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We should also consider that Sharpesbury’s failed prosecutions reflect
poor lawyering skills—another theory offered in the prior literature.132
“Winnable” cases can be lost in court when prosecutors fail to conduct an
adequate voir dire, make poor decisions about which witnesses to call, fail to
ask key questions on cross-examination, promise at opening what they do not
deliver at trial, or overreach on closing argument.133 Many of these failings
may be remedied over time as lawyers get more experience or training. But,
with the trial rate for criminal cases below five percent nationwide,134 it
would not be surprising if prosecutors in Sharpesbury made “rookie
mistakes” in court that turned winnable cases into failed prosecutions.
The Sharpesbury data also buttress those hypotheses that focus on
victims and witnesses. Whether the issue is their credibility, willingness to
cooperate, or readiness to appear, nearly one-third of failed prosecutions in
Sharpesbury could be attributed to victims and witnesses. The data do not,
however, explain why victims or witnesses may fail to cooperate or appear.
Prior literature has pointed to their loyalty to the defendant, fears of
intimidation, or even payoffs to remain silent,135 all of which are reasonable
possibilities. Although the Sharpesbury data do not offer enough information
to delineate between these possibilities, we can confirm that recalcitrance and
credibility problems with victims and witnesses are associated with a
significantly large percentage of failed prosecutions in this jurisdiction.
Finally, it bears noting that cases are lost when prosecutors charge them
incorrectly. This possibility was identified earlier, with authors such as
Richard Delgado decrying prosecutors overcharging suspects. 136 In the
Sharpesbury failed prosecutions, four percent of defendants faced the wrong
charge, and another one percent were prosecuted in the wrong jurisdiction.
Each of the wrong charges was an overcharge—meaning that prosecutors
failed to obtain a conviction because they sought a conviction for a crime
132
Ellen Yaroshefsky & Laura Schaefer, Defense Lawyering and Wrongful Convictions,
in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 123, 123
(Allison D. Redlich, James R. Acker, Robert J. Norris & Catherine L. Bonventre eds., 2014);
Alissa Pollitz Worden, Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Elizabeth K. Brown, Public Defense
in an Age of Innocence: The Innocence Paradigm and the Challenges of Representing the
Accused, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 210,
210–15 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
133
See Shinall, supra note 97, at 284.
134
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who
Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-arefound-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/R6V7-YPE6].
135
Shuey, supra note 101; Kocieniewski, supra note 109; Kocieniewski, supra note 110;
Trott, supra note 118, at 1381–432.
136
Delgado, supra note 77, at 1371–75.
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more serious than the one that they might have proved. To be sure,
prosecutors might have charge-bargained these cases to a lesser charge and
still have obtained a conviction,137 but in going forward, they saw a court
either dismiss the case or a judge or jury reach an acquittal.
Not captured, and a topic for future research, is whether prosecutors
might have undercharged any defendants. Is it possible that they failed to
achieve a conviction for a more serious, arguably more appropriate, crime
because they aimed too low in charging? In today’s national conversation
about criminal justice reform, outside of the recent #MeToo movement, it is
rare to hear academic researchers say the criminal justice system is not
punitive enough. But if one recalls the years in which prosecutors refused to
charge a defendant with rape because the victim had failed to physically
resist, it is easy to appreciate how undercharging permits a potentially guilty
suspect to avoid appropriate criminal responsibility.
Apart from these explanations for failed prosecutions, the data present
at least three other interesting issues. First, there is a disconnect between the
primary reason for the failed prosecution and the mode of resolution. As
Table 1 indicated, the predominant source of a failed prosecution was
inadequate evidence. Yet, as Table 4 showed, the plurality of cases was
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution following indictment. Why did it
take so long in the criminal justice process for prosecutors to reach this
conclusion? Did they push cases forward, reaching the minimum threshold
of probable cause for indictment, and then hope that sufficient evidence
would eventually arise to warrant a conviction? Or, did they wait to evaluate
the strength of the evidence until after indictment when they were
considering a plea or trial? Either way, the process is, at best, inefficient,
since the case eventually failed. During that time, the defendant was subject
to the control of the criminal justice system, when, in the end, the case could
not be sustained. Indeed, this depiction would appear to confirm the
conclusion reached years ago by Malcolm Feeley that “the process is the
punishment” for the defendant, even if he likely committed the crime.138
On a related note, there is an ethical question when prosecutors seek to
impose conditions in dismissing charges they cannot prove (Table 4). On one
hand, the process may be little different than prosecutors’ calculations in plea
bargaining, where they may offer a lesser charge or dismiss some but not all
charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, especially when the case
is weak. There, prosecutors calculate that it is better to obtain some
137
Indeed, a charge-bargain presents may of the same challenges as undercharging,
described on page 16, infra.
138
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).

2022]

THEORIZING FAILED PROSECUTIONS

361

conviction against the defendant, who they believe is guilty, than see the
defendant escape any criminal responsibility. One can imagine the same
thinking in dismissing all charges and accepting the defendant’s agreement
to take some other action—whether an apology, promise to avoid a place or
person, or even restitution or a contribution of sorts. But, if the prosecution
cannot establish guilt on any counts, is it acceptable to use the power of the
state to compel the defendant to undertake particular behavior simply
because the prosecutor believes the defendant committed the crime? For that
matter, should the defense even recommend this outcome to the client? Why
should a defendant agree to any conditions if the prosecutor’s case is likely
to fold anyway?
We raise these questions not to engage in the larger debate about the
ethics of plea bargaining when the state’s case is weak; similar questions
have been addressed before.139 Rather, the conundrum we identify also raises
questions about the very definition of a failed prosecution. Technically, a
failed prosecution implies legal innocence. Even if there is good reason to
believe that the defendant committed the crime in question—a supposition of
factual guilt—the defendant should be acquitted or have his case dismissed
if the prosecution cannot establish that conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt. As discussed earlier, we and others have contrasted the concepts of
factual and legal innocence in the wrongful conviction literature.140
Here, failed prosecutions may be similar to erroneous convictions
involving legal innocence. In both sets of cases, the prosecution fails to
achieve a lasting conviction because it cannot establish sufficient legal
grounds. The distinction between the two turns on the presumption that the
defendant committed a crime. A failed prosecution accepts that, but for an
error in investigation or prosecution, the defendant would have been
convicted. An exoneration of legal innocence, by contrast, is agnostic about
the defendant’s culpability, saying only that it is not certain he was factually
innocent.
The close relation between a failed prosecution and legal innocence is
not simply a philosophical debate. It also suggests that the causes—and
remedies—for failures in the criminal justice system are related. By now, the
primary sources of erroneous convictions are well known among scholars
and practitioners.141 In an empirical study, for example, Gould et al.
139

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 486 (2019) (discussing obligations
of prosecutors in negotiating plea bargains for misdemeanor offenses).
140
Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 483; Leo, supra note 5, at 201–23.
141
See GARRETT, supra note 5; Leo, supra note 5; Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby,
Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the United States,
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–60 (2005).
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identified ten likely sources, including problems in eyewitness identification,
tunnel vision, poor defense lawyering, and forensic errors.142 Other studies
have focused on false confessions143 and snitch testimony,144 among
others.145 As we explain in this Article, some of those sources are also found
among failed prosecutions. Just as eyewitness errors may convict the
factually innocent, suggestive eyewitness procedures may be attacked at a
preliminary hearing or in court and permit the actual perpetrator to avoid
punishment. Weak evidence undoubtedly convinces many prosecutors to
abandon a possible case, but it also is connected to erroneous convictions
when prosecutors, grand jurors, or triers of fact accept the word of state
witnesses when more questioning minds would view the information
skeptically.
Table 5 below provides a visual depiction of the similarity between
erroneous convictions and failed prosecutions, showing how some of the
sources are related. The most analogous are official misconduct—the kinds
of constitutional violations that see officers search a suspect without probable
cause or a warrant, unlawfully interrogate an individual, or fail to disclose
material, exculpatory evidence to the defense. Each of these may be grounds
for overturning a conviction (legal innocence) and, where the defendant
otherwise would be found guilty, is a source of a failed prosecution.

142

Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 515.
LEO, supra note 53 (examining police interrogation and the problem of false
confessions via a comprehensive empirical study).
144
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009) (reviewing criminal cases involving informant testimony).
145
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD, supra note
5 (identifying informant testimony as a potential source of wrongful convictions in a larger
assessment of miscarriages of justice).
143
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Table 5 – Similarity Between Erroneous Convictions and Failed
Prosecutions
Erroneous Conviction
Mistaken Eyewitness Identification
Lying Witnesses
Erroneous Forensic Evidence
Weak Evidence
False Confessions
Police/Prosecutor Misconduct
Tunnel Vision
Poor Defense Lawyering

Failed Prosecution
Not Credible Witnesses/Victims
Not Credible Witnesses/Victims
Chain of Custody
Insufficiency of Evidence
Wrong Charge
Police/Prosecutor Misconduct
Failures to Investigate/Prepare
Prosecutor Error

An advocate’s lack of skill can also affect the outcome of a case. In
erroneous convictions, poor defense lawyering—from lack of effort to
failures to properly prepare for trial or call appropriate witnesses—sees cases
go under-investigated or key evidence unchallenged.146 Similarly, as the
Sharpesbury data indicate, cases can fail when prosecutors make tactical
errors at trial, including mistakes in choosing a jury, questions to pose on
cross-examination, or opening or closing arguments.
Problems with witnesses plague both sets of cases. Mistaken
identifications and even lying witnesses too often have been credited by
police, prosecutors, and triers of fact, thereby leading to the conviction of the
factually innocent.147 At the same time, uncooperative witnesses and victims,
or those whose criminal records or past behavior raise doubts about their
testimony, may lead to failed prosecutions.
Suspects may also confess to crimes they did not commit.148 In turn,
prosecutors can be persuaded to file charges for crimes that did not occur, or
at least were not committed by the defendant. Alternatively, prosecutors may
become too aggressive, viewing the evidence in such a favorable light that
they seek charges more severe than the available information would support.
Left without other options, or even seeking to punish prosecutors for
overreaching, judges or juries may fail to convict defendants on the
heightened charges presented.
Forensic evidence also can influence both sets of cases. The annals of
erroneous convictions are replete with defendants condemned on the basis of
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Gould, Carrano, Leo & Hail-Jares, supra note 5, at 502–03.
Keith A. Findley, Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical
Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, 81 MO. L. REV. 377, 380–81 (2016).
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flawed forensic evidence.149 Whether it was serology testing used in place of
DNA analysis, forensic experts who over-credited the specificity of pattern
evidence, or hypnosis offered as the basis for an eyewitness’ identification,
imperfect and unsound forensic evidence has been the basis for several
erroneous convictions.150 The lessons from those errors have helped to train
a new wave of defense lawyers, now better able to push back on forensic
evidence that is not collected according to written protocol or is presented in
court by an expert who testifies beyond the power of the evidence. Even
where the defendant may have committed the crime, a trained defense lawyer
can now poke holes in the state’s forensic evidence and, in some
circumstances, even convince the prosecution to abandon the case when such
mistakes are identified early in the investigation. As Table 1 indicated, for
example, a small number of cases fails because of breaks in the chain of
custody of the evidence. In these cases, and in others in which forensic errors
occur, the guilty may go unpunished.
Of all the problems associated with erroneous convictions, tunnel vision
may be the most common source.151 It potentially affects all justice actors,
leading police officers, prosecutors, forensic scientists, and others to overcredit their theory of the case and overlook alternative evidence or theories
that challenge their assumptions. As a result, prosecutors may indict
defendants even in the fact of contradictory findings; detectives, too, may fail
to investigate alternative suspects or evidence because they are certain they
have “the right guy.”
On the flipside, failures to investigate may doom certain prosecutions.152
Perhaps officers are affected by tunnel vision, certain they have sufficient
evidence to indict or convict the suspect right up until a judge dismisses the
case for want of probable cause. Maybe an over-confident prosecutor fails to
read the casefile carefully, concluding all too late that a corroborating witness
is needed or that an eyewitness procedure was suggestive.
The same is true, ironically, for insufficient evidence. Table 1 illustrates
the prominence of this source in failed prosecutions, affecting approximately
one-fourth of cases. The concept is fairly intuitive: unless a prosecutor has
sufficient evidence to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
may go free even if the prosecutor is convinced of his guilt. As a result,
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prosecutors may require multifarious evidence to successfully bring a case,
including reliable forensic evidence, a videotape, or even the suspect’s
confession.
But, weak evidence is also common in wrongful convictions. This may
seem odd, that an innocent defendant would be at greater risk of conviction
when the prosecution’s evidence is weak. But, as prior work has indicated,
prosecutors may hold such cases, waiting to see if additional evidence is
collected.153 When it is not, they nonetheless decide to test the case before a
grand jury, which is inclined to believe the prosecution and issue an
indictment. At that point, defendants may agree to plead guilty to reduce the
ultimate sentence, or prosecutors may feel compelled to take the case to court
where trial jurors, for much the same reason as their counterparts on the grand
jury, convict the defendant. When weak evidence is coupled with deficient
defense lawyering, and especially when police or prosecutors fail to disclose
exculpatory evidence, innocent defendants may face an unfortunate “perfect
storm” that threatens a conviction.
Our ultimate point is not that erroneous convictions and failed
prosecutions are alike. Although some exonerations of legal innocence are
akin to failed prosecutions, the cases are distinct concepts. But, their sources
have much in common and reflect several of the same forces or behaviors
that lead to error in the criminal justice system. Best considered miscarriages
of justice, the two may be seen as different sides of the same coin.
V. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This project comes with many limitations. Foremost, we were reliant on
the judgement of one prosecutor, albeit the chief deputy of the office, for the
initial disclosure of failed cases. Prosecutors may be more inclined than
others to believe that the defendants brought to them are guilty, if only
because they are motivated to trust their partners, the police. Although we
also reviewed the recorded cases to eliminate those in which the defendant
reasonably had not committed a crime, we were unable to evaluate whether
there were other potential failed prosecutions that the chief deputy did not
record. So, on one hand, the case data may be overly inclusive, because
prosecutors as a whole may be motivated to consider the defendants guilty,
while, on the other hand, the dataset may have missed qualifying cases that
were unknown to the chief deputy.
It is also possible that the chief deputy incorrectly assigned a reason for
some of the failed prosecutions and that our translation of his judgements
into coding rules was erroneous. We employed traditional social science
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methods for the latter task, but even when intercoder reliability is high (in
our case over ninety percent), some percentage of cases may be coded
inconsistently.
In addition, Sharpesbury is likely different from many other
jurisdictions—from its size, rate, and distribution of crime, and quality of
police and prosecutors. The types of errors, and the parties likely responsible
for them, may well be different from those occurring elsewhere. That said,
we see these data as a window into a local process that has lessons for other
jurisdictions. These data help us to better understand how failed prosecutions
can occur, what the causes may be, and who the responsible parties may
include.
To our knowledge, these are the first empirical data on failed
prosecutions. That alone is important as a “reality check” of sorts on the
multiple theories previously propounded for failed prosecutions. Are things
different in another jurisdiction? Probably. But, the Sharpesbury data allow
us to test the theories of miscarriages of justice against real case data. As
such, this research helps to refine the theories offered.
As an initial step to synthesize and then quantify the potential sources
of failed prosecutions, this Article leaves multiple future avenues for
research. A primary goal should be replication, seeking out other
prosecutors’ offices willing to collect information on cases they believe were
lost in spite of the suspect’s likely criminality. In addition, it may be desirable
to employ expert panels, comprised not only of prosecutors but also judges,
academic researchers, and even defense lawyers, to assess the probability of
the defendant’s responsibility. Finally, just as erroneous convictions have
been studied against a control group of near misses, it would be useful to
compare the path of failed prosecutions—which could be conceptualized as
a different kind of near miss—against those that ended correctly. Certainly,
this study has identified a collection of potential sources for failed
prosecutions, but it will be even more instructive to understand how the
trajectory of a failed case compares against those that proceed as intended.
CONCLUSION
This is an exploratory article. But, individually in the specific sources
they identify and together in the image they paint of the criminal justice
system, the findings suggest there are multiple problems that can arise in
criminal case processing, ultimately preventing the identification,
prosecution, and conviction of the perpetrator of a crime. Many problems are
within the control of prosecutors and police officers, whereas others occur in
different ways yet still might be mitigated.
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Nor should some sources be unfamiliar to criminal justice officials, the
problems having been identified earlier in research on erroneous convictions.
Indeed, if this research serves a single purpose, it is to challenge the
assumption that erroneous convictions and failed prosecutions “are
unrelated.”154 “America’s criminal justice system creates a significant risk
that innocent people will be systematically convicted. It also creates a distinct
and presumably larger risk that the guilty will be acquitted.”155 Not only do
the two share similar sources, but they may also be different sides of the same
coin.

154

Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1321 (1997).
155
Id.

